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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2091 
 ___________ 
 
 SHANTI SARUP, 
       Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
      Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A097-435-749) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2011 
 Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed : April 13, 2011 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Shanti Sarup, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision 
pretermitting his application for adjustment of status because he was barred from such 
relief as an alien crewman.  For the reasons discussed below, we will deny the petition. 
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In 2002, Sarup obtained a “C-1/D” visa from the United States Consulate in 
Mumbai, India, allowing him entry into the United States as an alien crewman scheduled 
to join the Merchant Vessel (“M.V.”) Tunder King in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 
March 10, 2002.  He was admitted to the United States in Chicago, Illinois, as a “C-1 
nonimmigrant in transit” authorized to remain in the country until March 20, 2002.  Sarup 
did not join the M.V. Tunder King; he stayed in the United States well beyond the 
expiration of his visa.  He married a United States citizen in 2003, and applied to the 
USCIS for an adjustment of status.  The USCIS denied Sarup’s application in June 2004, 
finding that he was ineligible to adjust his status under 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(2), based on 
his entry into the country as a crewman. 
In 2007, Sarup was placed in removal proceedings for failing to depart the United 
States.  He conceded removability and re-applied for adjustment of status based on his 
marriage to a United States citizen.  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
sought to pretermit Sarup’s application, claiming that, as a crewman, he was statutorily 
barred from obtaining an adjustment of status under INA § 245(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)], 
and related regulations.  Sarup countered that he was eligible to adjust status because he 
entered the country as an alien in transit with a C-1 visa, not as a crewman.  In 2008, the 
IJ pretermitted Sarup’s application for adjustment of status.  The IJ found that the United 
States Consulate issued Sarup a C-1/D visa, which permitted him to enter the country as a 
crewman.  (Addendum App’x at 2.).  The IJ also found that, based on his I-94 entry 
document, Sarup was admitted to the United States as a C-1 nonimmigrant in immediate 
3 
 
and continuous transit through the country.  (Id. at 2-3.)  Relying on Matter of Campton, 
13 I. & N. Dec. 535 (BIA 1970), and Matter of Tzimas, 10 I. & N. Dec. 101 (BIA 1962), 
the IJ found that, even though Sarup was not admitted as a D nonimmigrant, he was 
granted a nonimmigrant crewman “D” visa to join the M.V. Tunder King.  (Id. at 3.)  
Thus, Sarup was barred from adjusting his status under INA § 245(c).  The IJ also 
rejected Sarup’s argument that INA § 245(c) applied only to those aliens who met every 
one of the statute’s eight categories of ineligible aliens.  (Id. at 4.) 
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision on appeal, rejecting Sarup’s argument that he 
was not a crewman under the law because he was a C-1 nonimmigrant.  (Addendum to 
Pet’r Br. at 3.)  The Board was not persuaded by Sarup’s assertion that the statutory bar 
did not apply to crewmen who have C-1 status, noting that “the applicable regulations 
explicitly apply to ‘any alien, who, on arrival in the United States, . . . was destined to 
join a vessel . . . in the United States to serve in any capacity thereon.’  8 C.F.R. § 
245.1(b)(2).”  (Id. at 4.)  The Board denied Sarup’s claim that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish that he was a crewman under INA § 245(c), holding that “in the 
absence of countervailing evidence, which the respondent has not offered, the record 
clearly and unequivocally establishes that he was admitted for the purpose of joining the 
crew on the Tunder King on March 10, 2002.”  (Id.)  Sarup filed this timely petition for 
review. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the question whether 
INA § 245(c) barred Sarup from applying for adjustment of status.  “Where, as here, the 
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BIA issues a decision on the merits and not simply a summary affirmance, we review the 
BIA’s, not the IJ’s, decision.”  Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  “We 
review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, subject to established principles of 
deference.”  Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004).  “We apply substantial 
evidence review to agency findings of fact, departing from factual findings only where a 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to arrive at a contrary conclusion.”  Mendez-
Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Adjustment of status “shall not be applicable to (1) an alien crewman.”  INA § 
245(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)]; see also 8 C.F.R. 1245.1(b)(2) (“Any alien who, on arrival 
in the United States, was serving in any capacity on board a vessel or aircraft or was 
destined to join a vessel or aircraft in the United States to serve in any capacity thereon” 
is prohibited from applying for adjustment of status).  The term “crewman” is defined as 
“a person serving in any capacity on board a vessel or aircraft.”  INA § 101(a)(10) [8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(10)].  An alien is a “non-immigrant” if he fits “within one of the 
following classes of nonimmigrant aliens --. . . . (C) an alien in immediate and continuous 
transit through the United States, . . . (D)(i) an alien crewman serving in good faith as 
such in a capacity required for normal operation and service on board a vessel . . . or 
aircraft, who intends to land temporarily and solely in pursuit of his calling as a crewman 
and to depart from the United States with the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived or 
some other vessel or aircraft.”  INA § 101(a)(15)(D)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(D)(i)]. 
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Sarup argues that he was a C-1 nonimmigrant in transit pursuant to INA 
§101(a)(15)(C), not a “crewman,” as that term is defined in INA §§ 101(a)(10) and 
(15)(D)(i).  He contends that only alien crewmen who are classified solely under a “D” 
visa are statutorily barred from obtaining an adjustment of status under INA § 245(c) [8 
U.S.C. § 1255(c)].  Thus, according to Sarup, the statutory bar does not apply to him 
because the Consulate issued him a “C-1/D” visa and he was admitted as a C-1 
nonimmigrant in transit.  As the Board correctly noted, however, Sarup’s C-1 status does 
not mean that he cannot also be a non-immigrant alien crewman.  See Matter of Tzimas, 
10 I. & N. Dec. 101 (BIA 1962) (holding that an alien crewman who was admitted as a 
C-1 nonimmigrant in transit was ineligible for adjustment of status); see also Matter of G-
D-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 82 (BIA 2009) (alien with C-1/D visa, who was admitted as a C-1 
alien in transit, was barred from applying for adjustment of status).  Sarup’s C-1/D visa 
expressly states that he was to join the M.V. Tunder King in the Port of Philadelphia on 
March 10, 2002, which indicates that he was an alien crewman under INA § 101(a)(10) 
and a nonimmigrant alien crewman under § (15)(D)(i).  His visa also allowed him, as a 
non-immigrant alien crewman in immediate and continuous transit, to travel to 
Philadelphia so that he could board the vessel and leave the country.  INA § 
101(a)(15)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(C)]; 22 C.F.R. § 41.71(a). 
Sarup’s argument that the BIA acted ultra vires in relying on 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1 
and the Foreign Affairs Manual to support its decision is meritless.  The Board’s reliance 
on the regulation, which essentially restates the law, and its additional reference to 
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advisory guidelines such as the Foreign Affairs Manual, does not amount to an ultra vires 
act.  Hollar v. Gov’t of V.I., 857 F.2d 163, 168 (3d Cir. 1988) (“An ultra vires act is one 
which is impermissible as beyond the power or capacity of the entity in question”). 
Sarup next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the BIA’s 
conclusion that he was an alien crewman, claiming for the first time that he used a 
smuggler to obtain the visa, that he never intended on joining the ship, and there was 
nothing in the record showing that he had a contract with a ship or that the Tunder King 
knew of his existence.  The record indicates that Sarup rested his case after oral argument 
on the legal issues presented.  (A.R. 116-17.)  As the BIA correctly noted, Sarup failed to 
offer any relevant evidence at the hearing other than his passport and visa, the adjustment 
of status application, and I-94 Form.  Based on the record evidence, we conclude that no 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to arrive at a contrary conclusion than the 
BIA. 
Accordingly, we will deny Sarup’s petition for review. 
